Metaphysical reflections - Determinism and free will

Could determinism and free will be both true ?

The many worlds theory

According to this theory, each time a choice is possible, the universe separates into several parallel universes, one for each possible choice.

Then, the notion of choice itself is an illusion. Let us suppose for example that I can chose between A and B and that I chose A. In fact it is only in this world that I chosed A. In another parallel world, I or rather my duplicate chosed B. I have the impression that this world is real and that the other is only hypothetical, but my duplicate has the impression that his world is real and my world is hypothetical. In fact in the absolute all worlds are equally real.

We might then conceive that the tree structure of all possible worlds could be totally predeterminated, and that we have an impression of free will, which would come from the fact that we perceive only one branch of this tree structure, and that branch which we perceive is not predeterminated.

Asymptotic predetermination or gigogne free will

The history of sciences shows us that physicists often believed that they found the fundamental constitutiog parts of matter, but discovered after that they are made of smaller particles (atoms -> elementary particles -> quarks -> preons -> ?).

We may then imagine that this decomposition might go on indefinitely. In this case, any physical theory stopping necessarily at some level would describe only approximatively the physical reality, because it would ignore the lower levels.

We could then produce a sequence of theories asymptotically leading to total knowledge of the laws of the universe, but never reaching it.

This would then imply that :

for any precision degree reached by a theory, a part of unknown, of non-determination, would always remain, what should satisfy the supporters of free will.
for any physical event, there exists a physical theory sufficiently precise to predict how this event will unfold, what should satisfy the supporters of predetermination.

Another way to ask the question would be : "Are we machines ?".

If we mean finite gatherings of pieces whose working is ruled by a finite set of deterministic rules, it is clear that the answer is no, because the decomposition into constituting parts being infinite, we would not be a finite gathering of pieces, and the sequence of physical theories leading asymptotically to an exact description of our working being infinite, it is not ruled by a finite set of rules. Our feeling of free will could then come from this infinite nesting of levels, the fact that we are infinite in the infinitely small. Concerning predetermination, may we consider that "Everything is written like in a book" ? This book should be infinite, but could we still call it a book ?